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SEVENTH CIRCUIT MISSES JUMPER:
FAILS TO PROTECT DISABLED STUDENT ATHLETES
KNAPP V. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
DanaA. Rice
INTRODUCTION

This case note is about a talented basketball player who was excluded from participating
in an intercollegiate sport because of a disability. The issue is whether Northwestern University
violated the Rehabilitation Act when it excluded Nicholas Knapp from its basketball team. The
Seventh Circuit held in favor of Northwestern. I will argue that the Knapp v. Northwestern
University decision was incorrectly decided. Participation in an intercollegiate sport constitutes
a major life activity for a student-athlete, and exclusion from that sport substantially limits the
athlete's ability to learn. Moreover, disabled student-athletes should be allowed to assume the
risk of participating in athletics when the likelihood of serious physical injury is uncertain.
II. BACKGROUND

Nicholas Knapp is an extraordinary basketball player from the State of Illinois. [EN 1]
Knapp's basketball abilities earned him an athletic scholarship from Northwestern University.
[EN 2] Shortly after accepting Northwestern's scholarship offer, Knapp developed a serious
heart condition known as "idiopathic ventricular fibrillation." [EN 3] As a result of his heart
condition, Knapp suffered sudden cardiac death during a pick-up game of basketball. [EN 4]
Following the use of electric shock treatment, which brought Knapp back to life, doctors
implanted a cardioverter-defibrillator in Knapp's abdomen. [EN 5] If Knapp's heart fails again,
doctors believe the device should restart it. [EN 6] Despite his basketball abilities, stable health
condition, and desire to participate, Nicholas Knapp never played basketball as a Northwestern
Wildcat. [EN 7]
Prior to his freshman season, Northwestern University team doctors declared Knapp
ineligible to play basketball. [EN 8] Aside from the professional opinions of two team doctors,
Northwestern based its decision on recommendations from two national medical conferences
known as the Bethesda Conferences. [EN 9] At the Bethesda Conferences, various cardiologists
and sports medicine physicians concluded that athletes with heart conditions like Knapp could
not participate in "any moderate or high intensity competitive sports" because participation with
structural heart disease is "contraindicated." [EN 10] After weighing the benefits of Knapp's
participation against the probability of his death, Northwestern's athletic director prohibited
Knapp from participating with the team. [EN 11]
In response to Northwestern's decision, Knapp filed suit in federal district court alleging
that Northwestern's actions violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. [EN 12] Knapp claimed that
by preventing him from participating with the team because of his disability, Northwestern was
substantially limiting his ability to participate in a major life activity. [EN 13] Knapp testified in
an affidavit that competitive basketball instills in him "confidence, dedication, leadership,
teamwork, discipline, perseverance, patience, the ability to set priorities, the ability to compete,
goal-setting and the ability to take coaching, direction and criticism." [EN 14] Based on Knapp's
testimony and the plain language of the Rehabilitation Act, the district court held in favor of
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Knapp, and issued an injunction forcing Northwestern to allow Knapp to participate on the
basketball team. Northwestern appealed.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the district court and lifted
the injunction placed upon Northwestern University. [EN 15] The Seventh Circuit concluded
that participation in an intercollegiate sport is not a major life activity within the meaning of the
Rehabilitation Act. [EN 16]
The Court reasoned that when determining whether an
intercollegiate sport constitutes a major life activity, the focus must not be on the subjective
opinions of the individual seeking protection under the Act. [EN 17] Instead, deciding whether
an intercollegiate sport constitutes a major life activity depends on the objective opinions of
everyday college students. [EN 18] The Court concluded that because the average college
student would not consider participation in intercollegiate basketball a major life activity
necessary for learning, intercollegiate sports do not constitute major life activities within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. [EN 19] To the extent intercollegiate sports could constitute
a major life activity for a student-athlete, the Seventh Circuit held that Northwestern's decision to
exclude Knapp did not "substantially limit" Knapp's ability to learn because Knapp continued
receiving his scholarship and had access to all of the University's academic facilities. [EN 20]
To be thorough, the Seventh Circuit also concluded that Knapp was not "otherwise
qualified" to participate in intercollegiate basketball. To state a valid claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, the party seeking protection must be "otherwise qualified" to participate in
the program from which he or she is being excluded. [EN 21] The Seventh Circuit concluded
that even if Northwestern's decision to exclude Knapp substantially limited Knapp's ability to
participate in a major life activity, Knapp was not otherwise qualified to participate because of
his serious heart condition. [EN 22] The court held that great deference must be afforded team
physicians and their universities in protecting their student-athletes from incurring serious
physical injury. [EN 23] The Court reasoned:
In cases such as ours, where Northwestern has examined both Knapp and his
medical records, has considered his medical history and the relation between his
prior sudden cardiac death and the possibility of future occurrences, has
considered the severity of the potential injury, and has rationally and reasonably
reviewed consensus medical opinions or recommendations in the pertinent fieldregardless whether conflicting medical opinions exist-the university has the right
to determine that an individual is not otherwise qualified to play without violating
the Rehabilitation Act. [EN 24]
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Northwestern University did not violate the Rehabilitation
Act by excluding Knapp from participating on the school's basketball team.
III. ANALYSIS

In Knapp, the Seventh Circuit circumvented the subjective opinion of one athlete for the
judgments of team physicians and Circuit Justices. In doing so, the Court ignored the purpose of
the Rehabilitation Act: "to permit handicapped individuals to live life as fully as they are able,
without paternalistic authorities deciding that certain activities are too risky for them." [EN 25]
The court lost sight of this purpose and incorrectly ruled that (1) participation in an
intercollegiate sport does not constitute a major life activity, (2) Northwestern's decision to
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exclude Knapp did not substantially limit Knapp's ability to learn, and (3) Knapp was not
"otherwise qualified" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act to play basketball.
A. IntercollegiateBasketball is a Major Life Activity for Knapp
In Knapp, the Seventh Circuit held that intercollegiate sport is not a major life activity
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The court reasoned that when determining
whether an intercollegiate sport constitutes a major life activity, the focus must not be on the
subjective opinions of the individual seeking protection under the Act. [EN 26] Instead, deciding
whether an intercollegiate sport constitutes a major life activity depends on the objective
opinions of average college students. [EN 27] The Court concluded that because the average
college student would not consider participation in intercollegiate basketball a major life activity
necessary for learning, an intercollegiate sport does not constitute a major life activity within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. [EN 28] Accordingly, if intercollegiate basketball does not
constitute a major life activity, Knapp is not disabled under the terms of the Rehabilitation Act
and lacks standing to sue Northwestern University. [EN 29]
The Seventh Circuit erred in failing to appreciate the important role that sports play in a
student-athlete's life. Intercollegiate athletics are "an important part of a university's primary
mission of helping an individual maximize [his or her] learning and career potential." [EN 30]
For many student-athletes, life lessons are best learned on the court rather than the classroom. In
the case of Nicolas Knapp, participation in basketball instills in him 'confidence, dedication,
leadership, teamwork, discipline, perseverance, patience, the ability to set priorities, the ability to
compete, goal-setting and the ability to take coaching, direction and criticism." [EN 31] For
Knapp, the benefits inherent in playing basketball cannot be duplicated. The Seventh Circuit's
opinion devalues this important fact by ruling that intercollegiate athletics does not constitute a
major life activity.
Even if intercollegiate athletics did constitute a major life activity within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Northwestern's decision did not
"substantially limit" Knapp from learning. [EN 32] To claim protection under the Rehabilitation
Act, Knapp must prove that Northwestern's decision substantially limits his ability to learn
generally. [EN 33] The Seventh Circuit concluded that Knapp did not satisfy this burden. The
court argued that because Knapp continued receiving his scholarship, Northwestern provided
him "access to all academic and - except for intercollegiate basketball - all nonacademic services
and activities available to other Northwestern students." [EN 34] According to the Court, this
unfettered access frustrates Knapp's ability to play basketball but does not "substantially limit his
education." [EN 35]
Knapp is an intelligent student-athlete. He graduated as valedictorian of his high school
class. [EN 36] The Seventh Circuit makes a strong presumption that Knapp's success in and out
of the classroom will not be substantially limited by Northwestern's decision to exclude him
from the basketball team. However, strong presumptions can cause inaccurate decisions. A
reasonable explanation for Knapp's classroom success in high school is his participation on the
basketball team. Student athletes gain a strong sense of accomplishment and gratification from
their participation in interscholastic and intercollegiate sports. Participation in sports motivates
athletes succeed in the classroom, if not for grades, then at least for eligibility. Limiting Knapp's
ability to participate on Northwestern's basketball team could have a devastating impact on
Knapp's success in the classroom and could substantially limit his education.
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There are obvious concerns with subjectively defining major life activities. The major
concern is that doing so might lead to an abuse of the Rehabilitation Act. Opponents of the
subjective view might argue that allowing individuals to subjectively define what constitutes a
major life activity will effectively swallow-up the distinction between major life activities and
those that are not. These concerns are justifiable. There exists no bright line rule to weed-out
potential abuses of the Act. But, Knapp's case presents no such problems. For Knapp,
participation in intercollegiate basketball is a major life activity, exclusion from which would
place a substantial limitation on his ability to learn.
B. Knapp is "otherwise qualified" to play intercollegiatebasketball
The Seventh Circuit held that Knapp was not "otherwise qualified" within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act to participate on Northwestern's Basketball team. [EN 37]
To
successfully invoke protection under the Rehabilitation Act, Knapp must prove that he "is able to
meet all of [the] program's requirements in spite of his handicap." [EN 38] "A significant risk of
potential physical injury can disqualify a person from a position if the risk cannot be eliminated."
[EN 39] In other words, if Northwestern can prove that there is a reasonable probability that
Knapp might incur substantial harm if allowed to participate, that alone is enough to exclude him
from playing on the team. [EN 40] A difficult problem arises, however, when there exists
conflicting medical opinions about the likelihood of future injury. [EN 41] The important
question in such a case is who should make the assessment of whether the disabled athlete is
otherwise qualified? [EN 42]
One author suggests three alternatives to resolving this issue: (1) let courts decide based
on the conflicting medical testimony whether or not their exists a substantial risk of physical
injury; (2) let the athlete assume the risk of participation; or (3) give deference to the team
physicians if their decisions are reasonable. [EN 43] The obvious problem with the first
alternative is that it gives courts sole discretion to weigh the conflicting medical opinions and
render a decision based on whose opinions are more persuasive. Critics fear that courts might
substitute their judgment on medical issues for those of the team's physician. [EN 44] The
opposite is also true: judges could substitute their judgments for those of the athlete's physicians.
Either way, allowing courts to decide whether the disabled athlete is "otherwise qualified" places
"less skilled" judges in the position of making medical decisions. [EN 45]
The team physician model is equally troublesome. [EN 46] The model affords team
physicians considerable discretion in deciding whether to exclude an athlete based on a medical
disability. To survive scrutiny under this model the school's decision to exclude the athlete need
only be "based on reasoned and medically sound judgments." [EN 47] In other words,
"exclusion is permissible only if the court finds the team physician has a reasonable medical
basis for determining that athletic competition creates a significant risk of substantial harm to a
physically impaired athlete." [EN 48] The Seventh Circuit utilized this model to exclude Knapp
from participating at Northwestern. The problem with this model is that the reasonableness bar
is too easy to overcome. A university determined to keep an athlete from participating in a
sports program could easily erect any legitimate medical concerns sufficient to clear the
reasonableness standard. In the end, if a school wants to exclude an athlete from a sports
program because of a disability it need only think up some excuse that will pass the
reasonableness requirement.

87

The athlete informed consent model is the most appropriate solution to determine
whether Knapp is eligible to participate on Northwestern's basketball team. The model makes
the informed opinions of the athlete the primary focus. The model embodies the purpose of the
Rehabilitation Act; it allows disabled athletes to make informed decisions about the activities
they participate in.
In his senior year at Peoria's Woodruff High School, Knapp suffered sudden cardiac
death during a pick-up basketball game. [EN 49] Conflicting medical opinions concluded that
there was between 1 in 34 and 1 in 100 chance that Knapp would die if he continued playing
basketball. [EN 50] Despite the inherent risk of suffering serious injury or death, Knapp elected
to continue his basketball career at Northwestern University. Knapp, with the help of his
parents, made an informed decision to assume the risk of participation because to him, playing
basketball was worth the risk. [EN 51]
In Wright v. Columbia Univ., a federal district court ordered Columbia University to
allow the plaintiff the opportunity to participate in the school's football program despite the
plaintiffs blindness in one eye. [EN 52] Columbia University denied the plaintiff the
opportunity to participate based on recommendations from the school's surgeon and legal
counsel. [EN 53] The plaintiff challenged his exclusion from the program citing a violation of
the Rehabilitation Act. In support of his position, the plaintiff offered testimony from "a highly
qualified ophthalmologist that no substantial risk of serious eye injury related to football exists."
[EN 54] Moreover, the plaintiff testified that he appreciated and accepted the "inherent risks
incident to playing football with impaired vision." [EN 55] As such, the plaintiff argued that
Columbia's decision to exclude him from the football team violated the Rehabilitation Act by
excluding an "otherwise qualified" individual from a federally funded program because of a
disability.
The district court held that Columbia's decision to exclude the plaintiff violated the
Rehabilitation Act. The court refused to give the University's paternalistic excuses credence.
Columbia University denied the plaintiff the opportunity to participate based on an
"understandable belief that plaintiff should avoid contact sports which might render him
sightless." [EN 56] The plaintiff, however, appreciated and accepted the inherent risks.
According to the district court, the Rehabilitation Act protects persons who make such a
determination from "paternalistic authorities deciding that certain activities are too risky for
handicapped persons." [EN 57]
Similar to Wright, Knapp assumed the risk that continued participation in basketball may
result in serious bodily harm or death. And like Wright, Knapp is an "intelligent, motivated
young man who is capable of making this decision which affects his health and well-being." [EN
58] The Seventh Circuit failed to respect Knapp's subjective opinion that basketball was worth
the risk of serious bodily harm or death. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit ignored the purpose of
the Rehabilitation Act, which is to prevent "in loco parentis" powers from determining what a
handicapped person can and cannot do. Rather than protect the rights of handicapped persons
who want nothing more than to be treated fairly in light of their respective disabilities, the
Seventh Circuit hid behind the subjective opinions of Northwestern physicians and university
officials in deciding that Northwestern's exclusion of Knapp from the university basketball team
was justified.
There exist potential risks of extending the assumption of risk doctrine to the
Rehabilitation Act. For example, allowing a person with a serious disability to participate in a
strenuous activity such as basketball or football could expose a university to liability in the event
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the athlete is injured. No doubt Northwestern University and Columbia University were aware
of this risk when they excluded Knapp and Wright respectively from participating in school
sponsored athletic programs.
Nevertheless, liability can be, and often is waived. If
Northwestern were to allow Knapp to participate on the basketball team, Knapp and his family
should be precluded from suing Northwestern in the event he is seriously injured or dies. In
other words, if Knapp is willing to waive the right to hold Northwestern liable for future injuries,
Northwestern should be required to allow Knapp to participate.
IV. CONCLUSION

Nicholas Knapp wanted to play intercollegiate basketball as a Northwestern Wildcat. He
possessed the requisite skills and passion to succeed at the college level. He wanted an
opportunity to participate, an opportunity Congress intended to provide him when it enacted the
Rehabilitation Act. Rather than respect Knapp's wishes, the Seventh Circuit held in favor of
Northwestern. The Knapp decision represents the Seventh Circuit's failure to protect a disabled
student-athlete from the paternalistic decision of one University.
[EN 1] Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 476 rev'd by 938 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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